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Abstract 
This concept paper explores an innovative approach to detecting and managing software 
vulnerabilities in cyber-physical defense systems. Software-based vulnerabilities that hinder or 
preclude the maintainability and evolvability of combat systems are a pernicious form of technical 
debt that threaten all cyber-physical systems. The risks associated with technical debt across 
increasingly interdependent DoD cyber-physical systems will accelerate if left unchecked. Without 
changes in acquisition and maintenance practices, we can foresee cascading, potentially 
catastrophic cross-system failures. To illustrate the risk and possible solutions, we focus on the 
software embedded in combat systems that are subject to ongoing modernization efforts that 
extend their applicability to evolving operations. Our research revealed that software 
vulnerabilities in critical combat systems can threaten the reliability and readiness of those 
systems. These vulnerabilities provide an opportunity for the defense acquisition communities to 
create a new capability within their organizations, an Acquisition Technical Debt Team (ATDT) to 
help detect, manage, and mitigate technical debt. We explore risk classification by including 
interoperability into risk evaluation schemas. We then apply common distressed debt 
management models to suggest when and how the ATDT might help manage and mitigate 
technical debt to help rehabilitate an ailing system.  
Introduction 
Over the past 60 years the Navy’s critical combat, command, control, and 
communications systems have evolved into software-dependent technological ecosystems that 
combine weapon, communication, and detection systems. These cyber-physical systems rely 
on the tight coupling of computational and physical processes to create responsive, timely, 
accurate, and lethal deterrence capabilities. This coupling creates management challenges 
throughout a system’s life cycle. Physical defense systems are designed over multiple years, 
maintained for decades, and periodically re-engineered to meet evolving operational 
requirements. Modern software systems rely on adaptive development cycles to meet evolving 
cybersecurity, technical, operational, and interoperability changes. Legacy software in critical, 
networked defense systems can pose an increasing risk to the systems and the warfighters who 
rely on them. Modernization requirements for both the hardware and software often introduce 
further misalignments and vulnerabilities. Software incompatibilities, diminished systems 
interoperability, and direct cyberattacks are a few of the risks that system maintainers must 
 
 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 93 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
mitigate to ensure combat system readiness. These software vulnerabilities, commonly known 
as technical debt, arise throughout the life cycle of the system and are mostly due to trade-offs 
made to meet time, cost, and capability requirements.  
Technical debt is a software engineering term that characterizes the design or 
implementation trade-offs taken to meet short-term business and development requirements 
that create barriers to future changes, including the maintainability and evolvability of the 
system; it can make these future changes more costly or impossible (Krutchen, 2019, p. 5). The 
technical debt landscape depicts the software elements that contribute to evolution and 
maintenance challenges (see Figure 1). Combat systems interoperability requirements can 
occur at any time in the software’s life cycle and primarily impact the software’s internal, 
invisible, elements. Furthermore, networked warfare systems may be susceptible to software 
vulnerabilities that occur in one combat component but permeate across the network.  
 
Figure 1: The technical debt landscape depicts the visible and invisible software elements that contribute 
to evolution and quality challenges. 
(Kruchten, 2012, p. 19) 
The interdependence of cyber-physical combat systems and their need to function and 
adapt to changing environmental conditions and operational requirements led us to wonder if 
the methods used for dealing with technical debt in the private sector were adequate for 
managing technical debt for weapon systems. Our research surveyed current practices in 
technical debt detection, classification, and management in the private and public sectors 
through a literature review. We augmented this overview with discussions with software 
scientists, combat system engineers, and military leaders regarding current practices and 
challenges of managing technical debt in combat systems. The research questions were: 1) 
What methods are being used to detect, assess, monitor, and mitigate technical debt, and 
realign/re-introduce refactored code into existing systems; and 2) What program management 
practices can best meet the time and technical demands of maintaining platform reliability while 
addressing complex, embedded software reliability issues?  
This paper is organized into the following sections: 1) a brief review of the impact of 
poor- quality software and technical debt on the U.S. and world economies; 2) a literature 
review of technical debt practices and concerns; 3) an overview of the challenges of maintaining 
weapon systems while managing technical debt; 4) exploration of a technical debt program 
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Technical Debt Impact 
The Consortium for Information and Software Quality (CISQ) reported that in 2018 the 
cost of poor software quality (CPSQ) in the United States was $2.26 trillion and the future 
(deferred) estimated cost of technical debt was $580 billion. They estimate that $635 billion was 
spent on legacy systems. The top five global IT failures in the news in 2018 were Wells Fargo 
Bank, PSA Airlines, Uber Technologies, TSB Bank, and Welsh NHS IT (Krasner, 2019). The 
CISQ report for 2020, in the midst of a global pandemic, reported the CPSQ in the United States 
was $2.08 trillion and the future (deferred) estimated cost of technical debt was $1.31 trillion 
residing in severe defects that need to be addressed in the future. They estimate that $520 
billion was spent on legacy systems. The top five global IT failures in the news in 2020 were 
Home Depot, Iowa Caucus Smartphone app, NASA/Boeing Starliner, Heathrow Airport 
disruption, and the Google Plus Security glitch. The majority of the costs were aggregated from 
publicly available source material on the cost of poor software. However, most IT and software 
organizations do not currently collect cost of software quality data, making these figures an 
underestimate of the actual costs (Krasner, 2021).  
The CISQ 2020 CPSQ report estimated that worldwide cybercrime will cost companies 
an estimated $6 trillion annually by 2021. They conclude that software vulnerabilities across the 
IT industries in the United States are creating a fertile environment for cybercrime. The three 
cost contributors to this exploitable environment are $260 billion spent on unsuccessful projects 
($177.5 billion in 2018), $520 billion on legacy system problems ($635 billion in 2018), and 
$1.56 trillion spent on software failures in operational systems. Given that there could be 
overlap between legacy problems and operational failures, the report reduces legacy system 
failures by 50% and concludes with a total estimate of $2.08 trillion in U.S. CPSQ for 2020 
(Krasner, 2021, p. 24).  
Technical Debt Practices, and Concerns 
The results of our research revealed that IT professionals and academics across the 
public and private sectors are actively working to identify, assess, mitigate, and manage 
software technical debt. Technical debt vulnerabilities can be introduced at any time in the 
software life cycle and across the technical debt landscape (see Figure 1). A meta-study of 94 
technical debt research studies conducted from 1992 through 2013 identified 10 technical debt 
types, eight technical debt management activities, and 29 tools for technical debt management 
(Li, 2015).  
The Object Management Group (OMG), an international technology standards 
consortium, has developed an automated technical debt measurement (ATDM) tool to measure 
source code reliability, security, performance efficiency, and maintainability and then create a 
time estimate for remediations of the found weaknesses to help guide corrective actions (OMG, 
2017). Early efforts that use machine learning methods to detect technical debt through natural 
language processing (Rantala, 2020) and forecasting for technical debt evolution through the 
use of linear Regularization models and non-linear Random Forest regression (Tsoukalas, 
2020) are producing encouraging results.  
Federal IT professionals report that technical debt directly impacts their mission by 
limiting the speed with which new functionality can be delivered. The complexity of the code 
base makes it more difficult and time consuming to modernize and increases the probability that 
additional technical debt will be injected into software (Curtis, 2018). There is a growing concern 
that modernizing or developing software capabilities by using machine learning for prediction or 
other functions, though cost effective, introduces more complicated, hidden, and rapidly 
accumulating technical debt vulnerabilities into the system. Software engineers at Google, Inc., 
warn that machine learning integrated into a system’s design can result in specific risk factors 
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that include boundary erosion, entanglement, hidden feedback loops, undeclared consumers, 
data dependencies, configuration issues, changes in the external world, and system-level anti-
patterns (Sculley, 2015). 
For the Department of Defense (DoD), technical debt is complicated by a spectrum of 
requirements including specialized combat systems, extreme and changing environmental 
conditions, changing adversarial requirements, changing operation plans, longevity 
expectations, spending requirements, contractual agreements, and legal constraints. Military 
missions often require an array of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) components for software 
and hardware modification. COTS requirements add another layer of complexity to technical 
debt due to system requirements differing from COTS capabilities. COTS and system 
mismatches include functional, performance, interoperability, configuration problems across 
versions, documentation, COTS evolution limits, interface differences, and COTS longevity 
maps. COTS requirements add additional technical debt detection and sustainment needs 
(Yang, 2018).  
Technical debt can result in vulnerabilities that can be exploited through a cyberattack. 
Weapon systems are cyber-physical systems of systems that are networked and rely on 
software integration and interoperability to perform critical functions. As the systems become 
more software interdependent and complex, the probability of cyberattacks increases. As 
weapon systems become more lethal, the need for sophisticated and trustworthy cybersecurity 
systems becomes more imperative (Chaplain, 2018).  
Managing Combat Systems and Technical Debt 
Our discussions with U.S. Navy leaders, software engineers, weapon systems 
engineers, and combat system maintainers revealed that they have been managing and 
working around technical debt issues for decades. Due to the specialized nature of weapons 
and weapon systems, many of their programs were early adopters of cyber-physical integration 
and have been in the forefront of developing these capabilities. Continual hardware and 
software modernization has resulted in complicated middleware processes to ensure 
interoperability across multiple systems. The need for increased capabilities without 
modernizing legacy code can create internal complexities and increase the probability of 
accruing additional technical debt. Sophisticated development and testing capabilities have 
been devised to maintain reliability and adaptability. Software architecture is a key component 
to interoperability, usability, and adaptability. Technical debt assessment needs to be broken 
down by components and interoperability patterns. 
Systems routinely undergo risk assessments and are scheduled for maintenance based 
on a standard risk scale that measures the severity against the likelihood of the risk. Technical 
debt may accrue because the assessed risk falls below the critical mark. Maintainers need a 
way to communicate the need for technical debt mitigation to program managers before 
functional or interoperability risks become critical.  
Maintenance and management of complex, integrated, and interoperable weapon 
systems suffer from technical and organizational constraints. Dealing with complex system 
interoperability issues across different generations of weapon systems is complicated, time 
consuming, and expensive. The acquisition requirements for meeting scope, cost, and time 
parameters are often in conflict with the realities of managing and mitigating legacy system 
technical debt.  
In summary, cyber-physical combat systems represent a special case of technical debt 
that falls outside of many public and private sector requirements. Their customized builds and 
configurations, the complexity of the systems, the age of some of their components, their 
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interoperability requirements, and the criticality of their functions make them more vulnerable to 
the risks of technical debt. These characteristics also make combat systems good candidates 
for the creation of a new acquisition capability designed to assist in reducing the defense 
specific risks associated with technical debt. Processes and practices acquired through this 
endeavor could save the Navy time and money by minimizing the current and future costs of 
technical debt while leveraging expertise within the Navy enterprise.  
Recommendation: Create a Technical Debt Program Management Capability 
Using Distressed Debt Practices 
Our recommendation argues that mitigating and managing combat systems’ technical 
debt risks during a system’s maintenance phase will require specialized and innovative teams 
within the acquisition community. The goal of an acquisition-based team is to assist combat 
systems managers and maintainers with the complexities of managing and mitigating technical 
debt across the component portfolio of their systems. By creating a specialized team that initially 
focuses on one combat system, program managers and combat systems experts can create 
and refine sustainable processes for technical debt assessment, reporting, management, 
mitigation, and reintegration. Ultimately the processes can grow into an acquisition capability 
that could be applied to systems across the Navy. A technical debt capability in acquisition 
could help mitigate technical debt at early stages and throughout the life cycle of cyber-physical 
combat systems.  
The U.S. bankruptcy codes and distressed debt management practices present a 
starting point for developing assessment and mitigation processes. The codes and practices 
have evolved to evaluate the “type” of debt-related stresses a company is under and methods to 
best rehabilitate the company or liquidate their assets. The basic goal is to realize that there is 
value in the larger cyber-physical system that can be rehabilitated if the ailments due to 
technical debt are mitigated. Creating mitigation strategies based on both the severity of the risk 
and the interoperability of the system is akin to treating the whole system rather than a single 
symptom. The initial focus on combat systems includes an inherent portfolio approach that 
combines integrated and interoperable systems whose dependencies may exhibit technical debt 
through association. The following is a conceptual framework whose intent is to serve as a 
starting point for future exploration, creation, and refinement. 
Create an Acquisition Technical Debt Team 
Create a cross-organizational Acquisition Technical Debt Team (ATDT) with expertise in 
acquisition processes and an initial focus on a pilot combat system that has been dealing with 
technical debt due to the interoperability of legacy systems. The team should include members 
of the combat system’s engineering and managerial staff, program managers who have 
experience with the system, and external experts familiar with the technological and operational 
needs for the system. The purpose of the team is to develop ways of assessing the health of the 
combat systems and identifying the processes needed to manage and resolve technical debt 
issues. The team could initially include external experts versed in assessing, managing, and 
liquidating distressed debt companies.  
Assess and Manage System-Wide Risks Associated with Technical Debt 
Given the integration and interoperability requirements of combat systems, we have 
created a risk cube that places interoperability along the z-axis (see Figure 2). The incorporation 
of interoperability into the assessment of technical debt risk will help determine the associated 
risk to external components and associated vulnerabilities that extend across the greater 
system. The goal of this approach is to create a classification schema, similar to the U.S. 
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bankruptcy codes, to helps the combat system’s resident team determine when to report the risk 
to the program manager and when to request a transfer of the problem to the ATDT.  
 
Figure 2: The Inclusion of Interoperability in a System’s Risk Assessment Charts the Degree that 
Technical Debt or Component Failure Effects the Greater System 
In practice, the risk cube would be generated using data from the combat system, its 
repair history, and relevant vendor or industry models. Multiple signals at the ATDT level over a 
short period of time, operational shifts, fielding of new capabilities for that combat system, etc., 
could place the system at a level where the ATDT should take over for the program manager 
until the risks are mitigated. 
In Distressed Debt Management (DDM), a distressed business performing “below 
investment grade” is determined to be either undervalued or about to default on their loans. A 
company may become distressed because of excessive debt, but other factors that can threaten 
the company are declining profitability, loss of competitive position, or changing business 
climate. There are three management strategies that depend on the type of debt the company is 
dealing with and the time horizon for recovery or liquidation. The three management strategies 
are as follows (Jain, 2011):  
1. Active Control—the business process is taken over by the management team 
with an exit timeline of 2–3 years and a profit target of 15–25% per year.  
2. Active Non-Control—the management is actively involved with existing 
management but does not take over the business with an exit strategy of 1–2 
years and a profit target of 12–20% per year. 
3. Passive—the management company invests in the existing company to create 
financial buffers with an exit strategy of 0.5–1 year, and a profit target of 12–15% 
per year.  
These management strategies can be extrapolated to the type and degree of involvement the 
ATDT would pursue to manage and mitigate the risks from technical debt on a combat system 
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and the systems reliant on it. The time horizons and profitability parameters could be used as 
guides for ATDT involvement and follow-on savings and/or estimated extended use of the 
combat system.  
Using the categorizations from the interoperability risk cube we can classify the type of 
involvement of the ATDT as follows: 
A. No ATDT Involvement—if the severity and the likelihood of a vulnerability are high 
but interoperability is low (HHL), then there is no need to elevate the problem to the 
ATDT. The risk should be dealt with by the combat systems managers and engineers. 
B. ATDT Passive Involvement—if the severity, likelihood, and interoperability of a 
vulnerability are moderate (MMM), the problem should be elevated to the program 
manager for that combat system, who would monitor the progress and might ask for 
guidance from the ATDT specialists.  
C. ADTD Active Non-Control—if the severity is low, the likelihood is moderate, and the 
interoperability of a vulnerability is high (LMH), the program manager and ATDT 
should be notified.  
D. ADTD Active/Non-Control or Active Control—if the severity is high, the likelihood is 
moderate, and the interoperability of the vulnerability is high (HMH) the ATDT might 
want to monitor the risk, or if there have been several risks reported, they could take 
over the management and mitigation of the technical debt of the system from the 
program manager and return the authority when interoperability risks have been 
mitigated and components replaced or refactored.  
E. ADTD Active Control—if the severity, the likelihood, and the interoperability of the 
vulnerability are high (HHH), the ATDT would take over the program management of 
the system and work in tight coordination with the combat system’s management and 
engineering team. Once the debt has been mitigated and the system has been 
restabilized (or retired), the management would be returned to the original program 
management team.  
Conclusion and Next Steps 
The effects of technical debt on software-based systems are creating a global concern 
and costing trillions of dollars in recovery and mitigation. The vulnerabilities inherent to complex 
systems and those reliant on legacy architectures are creating a fertile ground for cyber 
criminals and other adversaries. The DoD weapon systems are complex cyber-physical 
systems. These systems have been subject to ongoing requirements to modernize and modify 
both their physical and software systems to meet changing environmental factors and 
operational requirements. These modification pressures result in technical debt that their 
managers and maintainers have been contending with for decades. The risks associated with 
technical debt across increasingly interdependent DoD cyber-physical systems will accelerate if 
left unchecked. Without changes in acquisition and maintenance practices we can foresee 
cascading, potentially catastrophic cross-system failures. We suggest that the acquisition 
enterprise help manage and mitigate these risks by creating cross-functional teams dedicated to 
classifying and managing technical debt. We have used distressed debt management practices 
from the financial sector to seed an acquisition-based conversation. 
Suggested next steps: 
• Select a combat system that is already engaged in working through technical debt 
issues to learn existing technical debt evaluation processes and create a risk cube 
from their data. 
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• Create a cross-functional team familiar with the combat system and the technical 
issues that are contributing to vulnerability concerns. 
• Evaluate the interoperability risk cube and the technical debt management 
strategies suggested here to learn the relevance of these models to the combat 
system’s needs. 
• Continue this research to refine these concepts with the acquisition community. 
References 
Curtis, W. (2018, February 23). Solving the “technical debt” problem. FCW. 
https://fcw.com/articles/2018/02/23/comment-technical-debt-curtis.aspx 
Chaplain, C. (2018). Weapon systems cybersecurity: DoD just beginning to grapple with scale 
of vulnerabilities (GAO-19-128).  
Jain, S. (2011). Investing in distressed debt. UBS Alternative Investments, June, 15. 
Krasner, H. (2019). The cost of poor quality software in the U.S.: A 2018 report [Technical 
report]. Consortium for IT Software Quality. 
Krasner, H. (2021). The cost of poor quality software in the U.S.: A 2020 report [Technical 
report]. Consortium for IT Software Quality. 
Kruchten, P., Nord, R., & Ozkaya, I. (2012). Technical debt: From metaphor to theory and 
practice. IEEE Software, 29(6), 18–21. 
Kruchten, P., Nord, R., & Ozkaya, I. (2019). Managing technical debt: Reducing friction in 
software development. Addison-Wesley Professional. 
Li, Z., Avgeriou, P., & Liang, P. (2015). A systematic mapping study on technical debt and its 
management. Journal of Systems and Software, 101, 193–220. 
Object Management Group. (2017, December). Automated technical debt measure specification 
(Version 1.0) [Computer software specifications]. Consortium for IT Software Quality. 
https://www.omg.org/spec/ATDM 
Rantala, L. (2020, October). Towards better technical debt detection with NLP and machine 
learning methods. In 2020 IEEE/ACM 42nd International Conference on Software 
Engineering: Companion Proceedings (ICSE-Companion) (pp. 242–245). IEEE. 
Sculley, D., Holt, G., Golovin, D., Davydov, E., Phillips, T., Ebner, D., ... Dennison, D. (2015). 
Hidden technical debt in machine learning systems. In Advances in Neural Information 
Processing Systems (pp. 2503–2511).  
Tsoukalas, D., Kehagias, D., Siavvas, M., & Chatzigeorgiou, A. (2020). Technical debt 
forecasting: An empirical study on open-source repositories. Journal of Systems and 
Software, 170, 110777. 
Yang, Y., Wade, J., Alelyani, T., & Stanton, P. (2018). RT 193: Framework for analyzing 











Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management 
Naval Postgraduate School 
555 Dyer Road, Ingersoll Hall 
Monterey, CA 93943 
www.acquisitionresearch.net 
 
